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POWER RELATIONS AND SME STRATEGIES FOR CAPTURING VALUE IN 
GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS: VFX SERVICE FIRMS IN THE 
HOLLYWOOD FILM INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides insights into the way in which non-lead firms maneuver in global value 
chains in the pursuit of a larger share of revenue and how power relations affect these 
maneuvers. The paper examines the nature of value capture and power relations in the 
global supply of visual effects (VFX) services and the range of strategies VFX firms adopt 
to capture higher value in the GVC. We base our analysis on a total of 36 interviews with 
informants in the industry in Australia, UK and Canada and a database of VFX credits for 
3323 visual products for 640 VFX firms. 
 
Keywords: global value chain, market power, power asymmetry, non-lead firms, enterprise 
strategy 
 
JEL codes: O1 - Economic Development < O - Economic Development, Technological 
Change, and Growth, L - Industrial Organization, L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The regional development literature has portrayed flagship TNCs as playing a role in 
transforming regionally embedded networks of SMEs by linking them to more diverse and 
higher value-added segments of global markets (ERNST and KIM, 2002; HUMPHREY 
and SCHMITZ, 2002; SABEL, 2002). However, recent literature has drawn attention to the 
power inherent in network relations in global markets and in so doing has identified 
constraints to upgrading amongst SMEs and within regional innovation systems 
(CHRISTOPHERSON and CLARK, 2007a; JOHNS, 2006; KRISTENSEN and ZEITLIN, 
2005; RUTHERFORD and HOLMES, 2006). A substantial body of work has also explored 
the way in which lead multinational enterprises (MNEs) are able to maneuver within global 
markets to their advantage (BUCKLEY and GHAURI, 2004; MORGAN and QUACK, 
2005; PITELIS, 2006).  
 
Global value chaini (GVC) analysis provides a basis for understanding the possibilities and 
constraints on upgrading for firms and regions, because it provides insights into the way in 
which value is distributed across the value chain from conception to consumption and it 
incorporates an analysis of power relations associated with particular forms of governance 
of global value chains (GEREFFI, 1999; GEREFFI, 2005; GEREFFI et al., 2005). 
However, as KALANTARIDIS et al. (2010) have argued, the purposive actions or 
strategies of enterprises have tended to remain ‘in the shadow’ of global value chain 
analysis (pp. 2–3). This paper seeks to extend GVC analysis by drawing on wider research 
on power in global production networks and expanding on existing research on the 
challenges faced by SMEs in global networks. It identifies the ways in which these firms 
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maneuver to maintain profitability and capture a greater share of value in GVCs and the 
ways in which power in global production networks affects their maneuvers.  
 
Visual effects (VFX) firms in Australia, Canada and the UK which provide services in the 
production of films financed and distributed by large U.S. media conglomerates are the 
focus of analysis. The visual effects component of film production is an ideal context 
within which to undertake this research. There are clear power asymmetries between the 
media conglomerates and VFX firms arising from the high levels of concentration in the 
media and entertainment industries which resulted from deregulatory changes in the USA 
in the 1990s. As CHRISTOPHERSON (2006) explains, deregulation involved a retreat 
from the ‘Paramount decision’ which had forced the divestiture of theatre chains by firms 
that owned production and distribution activities in the film industry in addition to the 
removal of restrictions on television networks undertaking production. These regulatory 
changes allowed for a substantial vertical and horizontal reintegration of production, 
distribution and exhibition in which a small number of media conglomerates acquired 
control of distribution markets across a range of media including film, broadcasting, cable 
and DVD.  
 
VFX is a growing component of film production and is of increasing strategic importance 
within the global film production network. The financial success of effects-heavy films 
such as ‘Star Wars’ (1977) demonstrated the viability of using special effects in films 
(CUCCO, 2009) generating demand for VFX services (TURNOCK, 2009). Because most 
Hollywood studios had closed their own special effects departments in the 1960s, the 
effects were usually outsourced to specialist firms. With the introduction of desk top 
computing, entry costs into the digital VFX industry rapidly fell throughout the 1990s, and 
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the number of firms providing VFX services increased. Off-the-shelf software became 
available for many previously highly technical VFX processes further reducing the 
technological barrier to entry. Cutting edge VFX used in blockbuster VFX driven films still 
requires large R&D investment, but many other processes, such as rotoscoping and 
compositing can be performed with off-the-shelf software. Digital VFX are employed not 
only in all ‘blockbuster’ feature films produced by Hollywood (CUCCO, 2009), but many 
non-effects driven films as well.  VFX are therefore important to the success of films. 
Seventy percent of the shots in the ‘Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King’ were 
generated by computers rather than cameras (EPSTEIN, 2005, p. 347).  
 
Many films and other visual media now employ low level digital VFX because it can be 
cheaper than filming what is required. The demand for VFX has thus grown as costs have 
fallen. For the producers of films, then, the production of VFX has become an important 
and central activity in film production. Digital effects comprise an increasingly large share 
of film budgets (EPSTEIN, 2005, p. 21). With the work usually completely outsourced to 
independent firms, the potential therefore exists for the success or otherwise of films to 
ride, at least in part, on the VFX firms. 
 
In the 1980s, digital VFX were only produced in the USA, especially in LA and San 
Francisco, and in London, in the UK. Both of these regions had established visual 
entertainment industries; Hollywood in the case of LA, and for the British film industry an 
established TV broadcast industry based mainly in and near London. The reductions in 
barriers to entry into the industry resulted in a large increase in the number of firms 
providing VFX services not only in these two regions, but also in other parts of the world. 
Both Canada and Australia developed nascent digital VFX industries in the early 1990s. 
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Since that time, Canada in particular has exhibited large growth in the number of firms 
operating in the region, and has been successful in capturing a greater proportion of work 
from Hollywood compared to Australia. 
 
Visual effects firms that service film production and are located in production centers 
outside Las Angeles face several strategic challenges in seeking to capture value in the 
growing global market for VFX services. VFX firms are sub-contractors in the service 
industry that supports the film production sector, which remains relatively independent in 
terms of ownership arrangements, from the media conglomerates (NOAM, 2009, p. 105). 
However, as COE and JOHNS (2004) explain, in practice the production sector is very 
heavily dependent on the U.S. media conglomerates on whom they typically rely for both 
finance and distribution of their films. As such, these VFX firms are greatly impacted by 
the global production networks of the media giants.  
 
Further, VFX firms in Australia, Canada and UK face particular strategic challenges arising 
from their location outside the centre of production in Las Angeles (CHRISTOPHERSON 
and CLARK, 2007b; COE and JOHNS, 2004). Prior to the 1990s ‘runaway production’ 
was driven by the desire of producers to make differentiated ‘place-based films’. However, 
from the 1990s, it became a technique for the media conglomerates to create cross-regional 
competition, which enabled them to reduce labor and location costs as regions competed to 
attract film production to their shores through the development of supporting infrastructure 
including studio complexes and the provision of tax subsidies. VFX firms in regional 
locations are therefore heavily dependent on the state providing cost competitive 
environments for U.S. media firms. As Epstein explains, costs are an important basis for 
competitiveness of VFX firms (EPSTEIN, 2005, p. 351). This paper therefore focuses on 
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how power relations affect the strategies VFX firms in these regions adopt to capture value 
in global markets. 
 
POWER AND VALUE CAPTURE BY NON-LEAD FIRMS IN GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS 
 
Our research is concerned with power relations between TNCs and regionally dispersed 
SMEs and how they affect opportunities for the latter to capture a greater share of revenue. 
In contrast, regional development studies have tended to focus on mutuality or the 
commonality of interests between TNCs and regionally embedded networks of SMEs. The 
advantages of co-location of TNCs and SMEs have been described in terms of knowledge 
spill-over and learning effects in which TNCs benefit from local ‘sticky’ knowledge and 
SMEs in turn gain access to expanded global market opportunities and the external ‘world 
class’ or ‘ubiquitous’ knowledge of TNCs (ASHEIM and ISAKSEN, 2006). Further, TNCs 
offer local regions a buffer against the volatility of global markets because their products 
and markets are typically more diversified than the niche markets of regional SMEs 
(SABEL, 2002). Global flagship firms which coordinate networks of partner firms play a 
role in upgrading regional economies by linking with localized specialist suppliers and 
subcontractors who are required to meet the superior technical and managerial requirements 
of flagship companies (ERNST and KIM, 2002, p. 1420). The presence of TNCs can force 
local economies to upgrade production systems and products and to move into new areas of 
specialization as required by the lead firm (HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ, 2002, p. 1020). 
As such, local-global linkages may be an important explanation of innovation outcomes 
within local economic spaces. 
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Global value chain (GVC) analysis offers somewhat different insights into the nature of 
relations between firms in global markets because it focuses on the way in which industrial 
organization is governed in global markets and how those governance arrangements affect 
the distribution of revenue along the value chain (COE et al., 2008; GEREFFI et al., 2005; 
KAPLINSKY, 2000). The GVC is characterized by power dynamics involving lead firms 
and typically their suppliers, whose behaviors are coordinated through particular 
organizational mechanisms (hierarchies, markets, networks) which distribute resources in 
the chain. The GVC depicts the rules and structures which determine the opportunities and 
constraints firms face in seeking to increase their share of value associated with the global 
production of commodities and services. An analysis of the power dynamics influencing 
value capture or revenue share is a critical component of this approach. In GVC analysis, 
the level of power asymmetry between firms in a value chain varies according to the 
prevailing governance arrangements, which in turn depends on such factors as the 
complexity of transactions and associated information exchanges and the level of 
competency in the supply base. These factors all affect the ability of firms to switch 
partners and therefore their capacity to negotiate a higher share of revenue (GEREFFI et 
al., 2005).    
 
Others have adopted a broader analysis of power relations focusing on firm networks, 
arguing that networks necessarily encompass hierarchies of power in which some positions 
attract more resources and influence than others (CHRISTOPHERSON and CLARK, 
2007b). This is well demonstrated by JOHNS (20072006) who describes the global video 
games industry as one dominated by multinational hardware producers and publishers who 
are able to ‘manipulate the production network to increase their percentage of revenue’ as a 
consequence of their ‘positionality within the network’. Console manufacturers are central 
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to the network whereas developers ‘are relatively isolated in terms of network connectivity, 
occupying a more peripheral position than console manufacturers and publishers. 
Consequently, they are often in a weak negotiating position and are unable to capture extra 
value’ (JOHNS, 2007, p. 169). 
 
The existence of power differences and conflicts between TNC and SMEs in global value 
chains accords with CHRISTOPHERSON and CLARK’s (2007a) case study of the 
photonics industry in Rochester, New York, which suggests that the small photonics firms 
which supply TNCs also compete with them in relation to key inputs including skilled and 
specialist labor and R&D inputs. This results in an adversarial relationship between TNCs 
and regional SMEs.  TNCs in the region use their political and economic power to shape 
governance arrangements, which enables them to leverage key regional resources. For 
example, TNC benefit from ‘non-compete agreements’ imposed on employees which 
prevent the movement of labor between firms and also impede workers who might wish to 
start their own business. In addition, the research agendas of universities and innovation 
centers in the region are heavily shaped by TNCs. 
 
Further, clear differences in the strategic agendas of TNCs and regional SMEs is well 
demonstrated by KRISTENSEN and ZEITLIN’s (2005) study of the strategic orientation of 
a TNC headquarters and its constituent subsidiaries. They suggest a high degree of 
discordance between global corporate and local regional strategic priorities. While the 
headquarters of the TNC pursued financial market goals and reputation within the network 
of institutional and financial investors in the City of London, local subsidiaries measured 
success ‘against the rival technologies of leading competitors’ (p. 6).  Even more 
problematic was that the narrow financial agenda of the TNC headquarters resulted in 
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orders for subsidiaries to engage in downsizing, which ultimately led them to dispense of 
highly valuable labor with specialist skills which later had to be purchased from outside the 
firm at higher cost. RUTHERFORD and HOLMES (2007) draw out the implications of the 
competing agendas of TNC and their subsidiaries by arguing that the focus on short term 
costs, price reduction and intellectual property in US automotive supply chains diverted the 
attention of SMEs in the tool, die and mould cluster in Windsor, Ontario from knowledge-
focused production and was associated with a net transfer of knowledge from suppliers to 
lead firms within the value chain. Kristensen and Zeitlin concluded that the tension between 
the goals of TNC and regional subsidiaries was resolved in the subsidiaries’ favor if they 
pursued ‘subversive strategies’ that went beyond the mandate of the TNC headquarters 
(KRISTENSEN and ZEITLIN, 2005, p. 17). 
 
Global production network theory also has a broader conception of power relations in 
global networks than traditional GVC approaches, extending well beyond the focus of firm-
firm relations typical of value chain approaches. It is critical of recent literature in the GVC 
domain which parallels regional development studies by focusing on the capacity of firms 
and regions to upgrade in global markets. A GPN approach suggests that production 
networks are not ‘simply arenas for market competition or chains of value-adding 
activities’ (LEVY, 2008, p. 943) but involve the complex coordination of economic 
activities across geographically disparate regions with different socio-political and 
economic environments. In particular, GPN analysis is interested in how a range of actors 
including government, labor and employer organizations  (HENDERSON et. al., 2002, p. 
447)  ‘deploy resources, forge alliances, shape regulatory structures and frame issues’ 
(LEVY, 2008, p. 944) in political contests  and global power games. In this approach, 
struggles within the GPN are not just in the interests of market competition but are instead 
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an attempt to influence the socio-political context of resource control and distribution 
(LEVY, 2008, p. 943). 
 
In order to further understand how non-lead firms respond to power relations and maneuver 
to capture value in global markets, this research draws on resource dependency theory in 
the field of strategic management, which provides some insights into the variety of tactics 
firms use to manage power relations in their external environment to achieve stability, 
manipulate external dependencies and gain control over critical resources (FLIGSTEIN, 
2001; PFEFFER and SALANCIK, 1978). A foundational premise of resource dependence 
theory is that firm survival depends on the management of external demands including 
access to scarce resources for the purpose of reducing uncertainty in the environment and 
increasing power and influence (PROVAN et al., 1980). The pursuit of power and the 
mobilization of external resources are therefore critical motivations for firm behavior in this 
approach (OLIVER, 1991). As such, resource dependence theory provides useful insights 
into the variety of tactics firms use to manage the power asymmetries in global value chains 
for the purpose of securing access to critical resources which are the basis of higher revenue 
share or value capture in global markets. 
 
These tactics can be categorized as either unilateral or bilateral (PFEFFER and 
SALANCIK, 1978). Unilateral operations involve the reduction in magnitude of 
dependence on a particular resource and include avoidance involving diversification into 
other markets or the search for alternative partners in an exchange relationship (KATILA et 
al., 2008) for the purpose of altering the asymmetrical power relations within the value 
chain. Unilateral tactics also include mimicking the dominant firms by seeking to upgrade 
to higher value added activities in the production network (FLIGSTEIN, 2001). In addition, 
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a firm might pursue bilateral power restructuring operations, which include cooptation (the 
development of inter-locking boards or long-term contractual relations) and constraint 
absorption (such as mergers and acquisition), which are focused directly on the stronger 
firm in the power relationship. Alternatively, some firms simply seek to adapt to existing 
environmental constraints by selecting market segments in which they are able to survive 
(PFEFFER and LEONG, 1977; PFFEFFER and NOVAK, 1976; PFEFFER and 
SALANCIK, 1978).  
 
Recent advances in resource dependency theory explain that power imbalance would be 
likely to greatly affect the ability of a firm to adopt these strategies, particularly those of 
cooptation and constraint, because the dominant party in the relationship would be highly 
resistant to such approaches (CASCIARO and PISKORSKI, 2005). We would expect the 
dominant to take advantage of positions of power to extract concessions from the 
dominated (BACHARACH and LAWLER, 1981; BURT, 1980; FLIGSTEIN, 2001). This 
would suggest that power asymmetries are likely to hinder weaker firms in effectively 
upgrading in GVCs. The literature on power in global production networks provides a basis 
for understanding how broader network based power relations might also constrain the 
range of tactics firms are able to adopt in seeking to capture a greater share of revenue in 
global markets; there are impediments to firms pursuing particular strategies to capture 
higher revenue shares arising from the uneven distribution of resources and influence in 
global markets.  
 
This paper therefore seeks to further develop an understanding of how non-lead firms 
maneuver to capture higher value in GVCs and the way in which power relations affect 
their ability so to do. In so doing, it will extend the growing body of literature that draws 
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attention to issues of power associated with global production networks and the 
coordination or governance of global markets and the potential and actual constraints on 
value capture arising from the disparate power of TNCs and regionally embedded SMEs.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Our research is focused on the global visual effects (VFX) industry and the strategies of 
VFX firms in Australia, UK and Canada in capturing value and managing power relations 
in the Hollywood global production network. Our data shows that Australia, UK and 
Canada constitute the major centers of VFX activity outside Los Angeles. In addition, these 
regions vary in the number of firms operating within the region, their proximity to Los 
Angeles in terms of both space and time and the availability of markets outside the 
Hollywood production network, including domestic film markets and TV and advertising 
(Table 2) – all of these factors would be likely to affect the ability of firms in these regions 
to access revenue in the GVC and manage power relations with the Hollywood production 
network. Our main data sources for this paper are a total of 22 interviews with VFX firms 
across Australia, London and Canada and a database of VFX credits for 3323 visual 
products for 640 VFX firms. However, we undertook a much larger number of interviews 
throughout the post-digital and VFX sector (Table 1) which informed our theoretical 
development, such that our total number of interviews is 36. 
 
We were initially interested in the way in which technological change and globalization 
were providing opportunities for service firms outside the major centre of film production 
in Hollywood to capture value in the global film industry, and we sought to explore the 
mechanisms by which they became ‘successful’ in entering the Hollywood production 
network. Our first round of data collection involved in-depth interviews with nineteen 
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informants who were identified as being knowledgeable about the PDVii sector within 
Australia, including six firms that operate in the narrower VFX sector. The respondents 
were chosen purposively, the aim being to identify representatives of industry associations, 
firms and training institutes heavily engaged with the sector (Table 1). Interviewees were 
selected from a range of different organizations with the intention of limiting bias by ‘using 
numerous and highly knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from 
diverse perspectives’ (EISENHARDT and GRAEBNER, 2007, p. 28). In most cases, this 
person was either the firm’s founder or its current owner/manager. Interviews lasted for 
between one and 1½ hours and were recorded and fully transcribed.   
 
Early in the first round of interviews, it became clear that firms were adopting a range of 
responses to the pressures of the global VFX market, and that they were facing significant 
constraints in resolving their market uncertainty. The importance of resource dependency 
and global value chain theory became apparent. Following established protocols for moving 
among data, literature and emerging theory (EISENHARDT, 1989), we refined our 
questions to elicit more direct information on the global value chain, power relations, 
dependency and firms’ strategic responses, and to verify our initial theory development. We 
then conducted a further set of face-to-face interviews with firms; five in Australia (in 
addition to those completed in round one interviews), seven in London and five in Canada. 
We also conducted a telephone interview with a VFX producer in Los Angeles. The 
selection of interviewees was driven by theoretical considerations rather than statistical 
sampling; we used the credit database (discussed below) to identify a variety of firms of 
different sizes operating across the three regions. Once we achieved a high convergence of 
responses we ceased interviews (CORBIN and STRAUSS, 1990; MORSE, 1995). 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The second component of data collection involved the compilation of a database containing 
credit lists of VFX firms that have worked on film or television programs. Firms that 
serviced only the corporate market were not included as their credit data is not accessible. 
The purpose of collecting credit data was twofold. First, the data assisted with the sampling 
of firms for interviewing, and second, the data provided information about the number and 
characteristics of the credits that VFX firms possess in different regions of the world and 
how this has changed over time. This constitutes an important source of data for analyzing 
the transactions and exchanges that comprise the global value chain of VFX. As credits are 
evidence of an exchange relationship, the credit database is a critical source of information 
on resource dependency and power relations in the VFX global value chain. This data 
formed an important basis for identifying the number and types of transactions that the 
VFX firms were engaged in, with which exchange partners, in which sectors of the industry 
(film, TV, TVC) and variations across  regions and time.  
 
In creating the database we identified any credits listed on the company’s website or other 
promotional material. We also collected credits listed on IMDB.com, a widely used online 
film database. This database includes feature films, short films and television (TV) shows, 
plus a range of other formats. For each film or other credit for each company, the data 
collected included the title, date of release, budget, format (feature film, TV series, short 
form), whether the credit was a Hollywood related production (based upon the production 
and distribution companies involvediii), the country or countries of the primary production 
company and the name and country of any other visual or special effects company that also 
worked on that film.  These procedures produced a list of 640 digital VFX firms, plus their 
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film credits. The earliest credit was 1973 and the total film database included over 7870 
company credits.  
 
 
VFX AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL FILM PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
 
The production, financing, distribution and exhibition of motion pictures has traditionally 
been dominated by six Hollywood studio companies all of which are located in the vicinity 
of Los Angeles  (SCOTT,  2004a). Despite challenges to their dominance in the 1950s and 
1960s, including their forced divestiture of theatre chains under Anti-trust laws and the 
initial erosion of their market through the growth of television, by 2004 the six studios 
accounted for over 87% of the production/distribution sector (NOAM, 2009, p. 119). 
Concentration in the film industry is connected to the broader consolidation of activity in 
media and communications conglomerates. From the 1980s, mergers and acquisitions 
occurred across the broadcasting and film industries as television networks sought access to 
the film libraries of the studios (NOAM, 2009, p. 105). In addition, the studios acquired 
‘art-house’ companies to meet the growing demand for high-quality films ensuring that the 
Hollywood studios controlled much of the independent movie business (EPSTEIN, 2005, p. 
20).  
 
The concentration of ownership in the distribution sector is particularly important to the 
profitability of these conglomerates. However, although there is concentration in the 
distribution and financing arms of the industry, the production industry is comprised of a 
large number of semi-independent companies. As NOAM (2009, p. 105) explains, the 
vertical and horizontal integration of the industry resulted in a situation whereby the ‘major 
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film companies themselves became primarily distribution and financing firms that 
supported and bundled production of semi-independent production companies’. Production 
companies remain heavily dependent on the major Hollywood majors and associated media 
conglomerates for financing and distribution. Production companies typically require 
distribution agreements with studio-distributors in order to secure financing from 
independent sources (NOAM, 2009, p. 107) and independent producers rely on pre-sales 
across a variety of distribution outlets including pay-TV/cable networks and home video 
companies in order to secure financing (WASKO, 2003, p. 34). Production companies are 
compelled to connect to the distribution networks of the media conglomerates and the 
Hollywood majors are ‘gatekeepers’ in that process (COE and JOHNS, 2004).  
 
Within the film production network, VFX service providers are of increasing importance 
given that VFX are a growing component of film production, and therefore an increasing 
share of the global value chain in film production. As ROSMARIN (2007) explains, it is 
not just action films and animated features that incorporate VFX. Period dramas and 
romantic comedies typically include as many as 400 VFX shots including weather effects, 
backdrops and set extensions. Accounts of the VFX budgets of these films vary, some 
suggesting that producers allocate between 25% and 45% of their budgets to VFX 
(ROSMARIN, 2007), and more for animated features. In ‘Spider-Man 3’, (Sony) there 
were 70 minutes or 930 VFX shots. The budget allocation for VFX has increased even in 
non-action and animated films and in the more effects-intensive films, it has grown well 
beyond the estimated 10% of budget allocated to VFX in the original ‘Star Wars’ 
(ROSMARIN, 2007).  
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Despite the fragmentation and relative independence of the film production sector (in terms 
of ownership), SCOTT (2002; 2004a; 2004b) has emphasized the continuing dominance of 
the city of Los Angeles as a regional location for film production and ancillary services. 
While the preeminence of Los Angeles is a central feature of the geography of the global 
value chain, ‘runaway production’ including the VFX component, is an opportunity for the 
Hollywood majors to exploit regional advantages in the distribution of VFX service work 
globally:  
So what they now do is they look around the world and they divide the world up 
into various kinds of territories, not along political lines but along capabilities and 
cost lines. They know exactly what incentives policies are in play in any territory. 
And they know what that territory is good for in terms of particular kinds of work. 
They also know what houses and studios exist in those territories and they know 
what they’ve done (A4).  
 
As a consequence, conflict emerges between territories to attract ‘runaway’ VFX work. The 
global distribution of VFX work ensures that there is sufficient competition between firms 
in different territories in seeking to attract work on films that are part of the Hollywood 
global production network, which intensifies competition between service providers, and 
therefore reduces their power in the production network. The decision by Hollywood 
gatekeepers to carve up work globally is a risk management strategy (COE and JOHNS, 
2004). It ensures that the Hollywood production network is not overly focused on any one 
VFX house or market. 
Hollywood is very good at managing …. Like they have an interest in having 
people working on this all over the world so that they’re not beholden to one place. 
So there’s a desire from them to spread the work around to a certain level (A9). 
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Some of the big studios, they have overall strategic objectives in terms of where 
they want to place their work geographically and they like to not be reliant on 
particular locales (L1). 
 
In this context, the dependency of VFX service providers on the Hollywood production 
network arises from the fact that there are only twenty to thirty films per year that have a 
sufficiently large VFX budget to sustain the highly specialist VFX firms. In addition, 
interviewees reported a strong creative desire to capture work on large budget films that are 
part of the Hollywood network because they were regarded as more creatively challenging, 
which draws attention to the non-economic dimension of dependency, which is well 
documented with respect to the creative industries (GIBSON and KONG, 2005). As such, 
while VFX firms can and do enter into exchanges in other segments of the VFX market 
,such as advertising, firms wishing to work in film remain highly dependent on the 
Hollywood production network. As shown in Table 2, over the whole sample of firms, 
74.3% of credits were Hollywood-related and the majority of these credits were in film. As 
expected, this percentage was highest for USA-based firms.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
 
The high dependence on the Hollywood network is intensified by the relatively weak 
position of power that VFX service providers have as a result of intense competition and 
the ability of producers in the Hollywood network to switch between exchange partners. 
This is in part explained by the increasing number of firms providing VFX services. As 
shown in Figure 1, in all geographical regions the number of firms operating in the industry 
has increased over time, with large growth in the number of firms operating within the USA 
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from the early 1980s and in the rest of the world since the early 1990s. Competition has 
been intensified by the lowering of barriers to entry arising from technological changes as 
well as the globalization of the market. The initial growth in the industry occurred with the 
introduction of computers into the production of VFX (RICKITT, 2006; TURNOCK, 
2009), beginning the transition from a film  based optical effects industry to a digital 
industry. This transition intensified with the introduction of desktop computers into the 
industry in the early 1990s which significantly lowered cost-based entry barriers. There are 
a larger number of firms carrying out VFX work in each of London, Canada and Australia 
(Figure 1). Hollywood producers take advantage of this competition: 
Producers know it and they know how to play the game and triumph. They go X, Y, 
Z, get all the bids, go back again X, Y, Z and then just play and play and play until 
players just pull out and say you know what, it’s just not worth it. It’s just not worth 
competing (C5). 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
A further source of weakness for VFX firms in the Hollywood production network arises 
from their positioning in the global value chain at the end of production. Visual effects 
firms have to compete for funds after budgets have already been consumed by production 
costs and other service providers. This seems to be a consequence of VFX having 
previously been a component of post-production, which occurred towards the end of 
production. VFX work is increasingly embedded in the production process itself, but the 
allocation of budgets to VFX has not changed accordingly: 
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The visual effect companies are at the bottom of the food chain. I don’t understand 
why that is. I still don’t. I mean I understood a bit more when we were much more 
post-production oriented but now we’re production (L6). 
 
This was confirmed by a VFX producer who noted that ‘anybody at the end of the process 
of filmmaking gets the biggest squeeze’.  
 
VALUE CAPTURE STRATEGIES OF VFX FIRMS 
The above discussion indicates that VFX firms face a range of pressures arising from the 
nature of power in global value chains, including entering into exchanges within the 
Hollywood network and negotiating around low margins and intense competition. Our data 
indicate that firms have adopted a variety of responses to the effects of their dependency on 
the Hollywood network and the power asymmetries in the global film production network.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Adaptation: Selecting Market Segments  
Adaptation as a response to market pressure does not achieve a reduction or loosening of 
power asymmetries and dependency on the Hollywood network, but is instead a mechanism 
for coping with rather than challenging or seeking to restructure power relations. As 
PFEFFER and SALANCIK (1978, p. 107) explain, organizations can respond to their 
environment as ‘an environmental requirement taker’ in the sense of adapting to rather than 
seeking to change their dependencies. One component of this approach involves 
organizations searching for an environment or market segment within which they can 
successfully compete in the context of a given set of environmental constraints.  
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One of the mechanisms for maintaining profitability involves the control of costs or 
fundamental inputs into the production process. Variation in the size of VFX firms and the 
types of VFX projects they undertake (large or small budget films) represent different 
tactics for controlling two critical resource costs in the form of labor and technological 
infrastructure. Firms seek to control these costs in an attempt to deal with a lack of 
continuity of absorption of VFX services. Table 3 shows the large variation in the mean 
budgets of film credits of interview firms, which range from around ten to well over 100 
million (USD). Managing value capture through the selection of market segments, 
however, involves more than a choice between large and small budget films; the size of the 
core workforce of the firm and its technology infrastructure are also elements of market 
segmentation. 
 
Some firms remain small and specifically target lower budget films. They offer ‘efficient, 
quick solutions’ that do not require complete computer graphics (CG) to produce the shot, 
because full CG solutions are research and development (R&D) intensive and therefore 
expensive. They explicitly avoid ‘over-engineering’ solutions and always look for a low-
technology route to achieve results. They select 2D rather than 3D solutions because the 
latter are resource intensive. They avoid the ‘Apocalypse Now’ syndrome: 
If you were in a jungle with a lot of money and a lot of resources, you end up 
napalming the whole jungle because you can. When you have all the technical 
equipment and you have a bunch of R&D people and loads of CG people, you go 
for R&D, you do the CG solutions because you can. Why not? Because the solution 
is there if you always take that route (L4). 
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Wherever possible, these firms use ‘out of the box’ solutions that are optimized software 
that allows them to build scenes for a fraction of the cost of R&D and CG.  
 
An alternative route is to invest in more equipment, and in particular more workstations, 
retain a larger core workforce and be prepared to upscale quickly in order to target large 
projects in the relatively small number of films that have very large VFX components. 
Once investment in scale is undertaken, larger firms remain locked in to the high-end of the 
market because the margin on small films is insufficient to meet costs. These large facilities 
are engaged in R&D, often in the form of 3D which is resource intensive; they build 
software solutions around 3D platforms such as Maya or XSI while the smaller firms rely 
more heavily on ‘off the shelf’ software. The larger firms maintain substantial R&D 
overheads and significant expertise to maintain their pipelines, and further resources to 
manage the large number of digital assets that are developed and stored for every project.  
 
Small firms report that they stay small in order to avoid the risks of becoming a larger 
facility because larger facilities can go under within weeks if they are unsuccessful in 
securing a continuous flow of work in large VFX films. Despite the high risk associated 
with growth, these larger VFX firms have ‘countervailing resources’ in the form of a 
sufficiently large workforce and technology infrastructure to undertake a large number of 
complex VFX shots. This is a point of competitive differentiation and source of 
countervailing power in relation to the Hollywood production network: 
If they [producers] come into a small boutique company, they’re more apt to just 
throw their weight around, try to get exactly what they want and just hammer this 
company until they give us what we want [C5]. 
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Finally, other firms deal with the problem less explicitly by maintaining a capacity for 
‘upscaling’. These firms have developed an ability to find talent and upscale operations. 
One London firm explained that it operates as a very small firm but is capable of delivering 
on large projects because of the reputation of its core employees and because it delivers on 
projects by up-scaling: 
This has to be the smallest facility in Soho if not the world…But we’re capable of 
taking on enormous projects, projects with good kudos, high quality work, high 
quality directors and we do that by, whenever we get a job, we look and see what 
resources are required and we find those resources (L5). 
 
While project management firms are typical throughout the creative industries (WHITELY, 
2005), this is relatively new to the VFX sector and arises from the increasing size of 
projects and the very high risk of trying to maintain a permanent salaried workforce. These 
VFX firms are now differentiated by the capacity to bring together teams and manage the 
logistics of delivery, rather than the creative talent of a core workforce or the physical 
infrastructure or technology of the firm. 
 
Avoidance: Diversification 
Diversification is one of the tactics firms can use to reduce their dependency and thereby 
improve their power and profitability, by reducing the concentration of their output 
absorbed by any one link in the value chain (PFEFFER and SALANCIK, 1978). A 
response to the tight margins in the VFX industry is to maintain operations across a range 
of sub-sectors such as film, TV or TVC.  Table 3 shows the extent of specialization in 
interviewee firms. The level of film specialization ranges from no film credits for one UK 
firm, to 100% for a number of Canadian firms. 
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Some firms indicated that it was not possible to service a range of sub-sectors; this was 
explained in terms of the ‘snobbery in film’, which was regarded as the more creative 
format, and which meant that film clients were suspicious of firms that did not specialize in 
film. One UK firm indicated that the market segments of film and TV were completely 
separate in the UK such that ‘never the twain shall meet’ (London VFX firm). A further 
explanation was the different capabilities demanded by the different sectors: 
The film people are after a very bespoke service and that’s the difference, isn’t it?  
Just after very bespoke, my film’s special, it’s not like every other film and I want a 
very specialized service. Whereas TV people are very much like, well, it’s the 
process, this is TV, I’ve got to get out an episode every two weeks. Bespoke is great 
but it’s not, I need process here, I need to know that an episode’s going to appear 
every two weeks and you know how to do that and we’re not going to be gazing at 
our navels (L4). 
 
However, other firms indicated that working in a range of sub-sectors such as TV and in 
particular TVC enabled firms to cross-subsidize their less profitable film work. One firm 
indicated that 85% of its work was in commercials and the remainder was in long-form and 
film (London VFX firm). Yet another firm reported that it was established with a 
specialization in film and TVC and was now doing mainly TV (London VFX). In strong 
contrast to other firms quoted previously that indicated that the sub-sectors were 
incompatible, one firm reported that it was diversifying from film to commercials because 
the latter was more lucrative: 
I suppose off the top of my head I’d say film accounted for probably about 35%, 
commercials 50, 60, and the rest odds and sods which would, it’s extraordinary 
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what stuff gets asked for. I mean there’s music videos, there’s concerts, screen 
projections, stuff for the internet. There’s lots of little random jobs and you think 
what’s that for but it’s visual (L5). 
The same firm stated that they were considering engaging in other visual work in sectors 
such as museums. Another VFX firm was already undertaking work in print which they 
reported was very close to TV:  
It’s a natural fit. We both do very creative parts of things. Obviously there’s the 
non-creative part and there’s the block printing stuff but if you think of any of the 
massive sort of billboards or any of the campaigns that you see, they tend to be very 
high-end creative work. And it’s the same kit (L7).  
 
For this firm, it was necessary to mix ‘high-end cool’ with ‘bread-and-butter’ work in order 
to survive. Firms could not afford to tightly specialize in one segment of the market; firms 
had to diversify if they wanted to ‘stay alive’: 
I don’t just rely on commercials. I don’t just rely on TV. I don’t rely on film. I don’t 
rely on any of those markets individually. It’s a massive mix (L7). 
 
A more dramatic shift in format includes the activities of one London firm in providing 
VFX for three-minute episodes on the web that involved product placement. However, only 
one firm reported involvement in on-line activities and these were regarded as marginal to 
their core operations. There appears to be some regional differences in the use of this 
strategy. The UK is a well-recognized major television broadcast (COOKE and PANDIT, 
2005) and advertizing centre (GRABHER, 2002), so many firms operate in these sectors, 
more so than film, which might explain the lower level of specialization in film amongst 
UK firms compared with Canadian and Australian firms (Table 3).  
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Mimicking: Re-positioning in the Value Chain  
A further response to their weak position in the VFX global value chain involves firms’ 
attempts to reposition themselves in GVCs in order to improve their margins by 
participating in higher value-added activities. Two of our interviewee firms have adopted 
this strategy (Table 3, see column ‘Does Production?’). In this scenario, firms are seeking 
to capture the advantages of Hollywood in its control over production by trying in effect to 
imitate the dominant organization (FLIGSTEIN, 2001). One London firm clearly 
articulated the need for this type of response to the pressures of the GVC. The imperative to 
move within the value chain was linked to the low margins and high expectations placed on 
VFX firms associated with them being at the ‘bottom of the food chain’: 
.  I was at a talk by UK Screen last night…What this guy was saying is you should 
try and just go up the food chain, go in there. And I think actually that’s what we’ve 
just been doing. And that’s definitely interesting. Just go up the food chain and go, 
you know what, we can do that and show you the price that we’re doing it for and 
you probably won’t be that shot because you’re used to paying that for all these 
layers beneath you. We must not underestimate the importance of those layers in 
between us and that client to get those professionals on board (L5). 
 
One such technique involves ‘moving into content’ through various means of capturing 
intellectual property (IP) rights in a film project. This is well illustrated by the attempts of 
Animal Logic to capture value through IP ownership. Warner Brothers Pictures formed an 
agreement with Animal Logic in May 2007 to develop and co-produce three animated 
feature films. Animal Logic established its reputation for the production of animated feature 
films with ‘Happy Feet’ (2006), during which it transitioned from a VFX service provider 
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to a production house, which resulted in a growth in its core crew from around 150 to a 
peak of 500. As a follow-on to this agreement, Animal Logic has produced an animated 
feature film, ‘Guardians of Ga’hoole’, for Village Roadshow Pictures at the Fox Studio in 
Sydney involving  the  employment of around 300 artists (MORGAN, 2008). Controlling 
IP has become an objective of some firms who see it as an essential step in capturing an 
increasing share of value in the GVC (Personal interviews, Industry Bodies, Australia 
2007).  
 
However, other firms indicated that this strategy is only available to the ‘big boys’ who 
have close networks with the studios and a track record delivering on large VFX projects. 
Yet another firm warned of the dangers of seeking to undertake production independently 
of, or in competition with, the studios because of the risk that they will not use your 
services on future film projects. Firms which have undertaken this approach, such as 
Animal Logic in Australia or Framestore-CFC in the UK, have done so in collaboration 
rather than in competition with the studios. For example, Framestore-CFC, a large London-
based VFX firm, set up an animation studio to produce an animated film called ‘The Tale 
of Despereaux’ (2008) in collaboration with Universal Studios. This path to production 
appears to be open more to firms operating with animation, in particular 3D character 
animation, than those firms who work only on photo-realistic VFX.  
 
Firms are experimenting with other techniques for increasing their intellectual property 
rights including taking equity in a project. One firm explained to us that VFX firms in 
London had started taking cash payments to cover costs and were seeking equity as margin 
on VFX film projects. However, as competition had intensified, they had begun to accept 
equity to cover costs and were not receiving any margin. The same firm indicated that a 
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potentially more advantageous strategy was to use sales agents who negotiate a VFX firm’s 
equity in a project at the stage of conception, rather than seeking to negotiate equity stakes 
at the point of post-production after prior equity arrangements are in place.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The paper has utilized GVC analysis and broader theories of power in global production 
networks to develop an understanding of the global film production network. VFX firms 
occupy a peripheral and highly dependent position in the global network in which 
Hollywood majors are key gatekeepers for the broader media conglomerates. This is a 
consequence of the high levels of concentration in the finance and distribution sectors and 
the dependence of production firms on distribution agreements as a precondition for 
accessing finance for a film (COE and JOHNS, 2004) 
 
These characteristics of the global film production network constrain the strategic choices 
of VFX firms seeking to capture a higher share of revenue in the global film market. One 
approach VFX firms are adopting involves unilateral action to try to identify a segment of 
the market in which it is possible to compete (or survive). By controlling their key inputs of 
labor and technology infrastructure, firms seek to manage the environmental pressures that 
arise from their heavy dependence on the Hollywood market. They do this by focusing on 
particular segments of the market, such as high intensity VFX projects on large budget 
films or low-engineered solutions for low budget films. These firms adopt a strategy of 
adaption which involves identifying a market segment in which they are able to survive 
while excluding others (PFEFFER and SALANCIK, 1978, p.  107). This is effectively a 
                                                                                                                                           30 
 
 
coping strategy rather than one involving a restructuring of power and resource 
dependencies.  
 
Unilateral responses with the potential to restructure the power and resource dependencies 
of VFX firms are also highly constrained by the characteristics of the global film 
production network. Some VFX firms attempt a strategy of avoidance involving 
diversification into other VFX markets such as TV and TVC. However, the effectiveness of 
this strategy is limited by the fact that other segments of the market are typically also 
dominated by the media conglomerates of which the Hollywood majors are a part (SCOTT, 
2004b). As explained above, the TV sector in the USA exhibits a substantial vertical 
integration with the Hollywood majors in addition to some other very large and also 
vertically integrated media companies (FCC, 2007). This is not the case in relation to 
material distributed on-line. However, only one firm reported that it was engaged in VFX 
work for on-line distribution and noted that it was a marginal activity.  
 
Finally, a very small number of firms have sought to avoid their resource dependencies by 
mimicking the dominant firms. This involves firms re-positioning themselves in the value 
chain to gain greater control over production. As FLIGSTEIN (2001, p. 17) explains, for 
dominated firms, an alternative to finding a position in the market (or niche) in which they 
are able to survive is to seek to imitate dominant firms. There are a small number of 
examples of VFX firms operating as production houses and not merely service firms. 
However, a major threat for firms undertaking this type of activity is that they cannot afford 
to offend the Hollywood majors. This is because VFX firms rely so heavily on the 
Hollywood global film production network. As such, firms that have become involved in 
production have done so in collaboration with the Hollywood majors. It should also be 
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noted that this constitutes a very weak form of ‘imitating the dominant’, because the key 
advantage of the Hollywood majors is in fact their stronghold on the global distribution and 
exhibition sector, rather than their dominance of production (SCOTT, 2004a; 2004b).  
 
There is also a range of strategies which are not being adopted by VFX firms; these include 
cooptation (the development of inter-locking boards or long-term contractual relations) and 
constraint absorption (such as mergers and acquisitions). These options are not available to 
SMEs in the global film production network. Such tactics would require the cooperation of 
the Hollywood majors and the broader media conglomerates of which they are a part and 
they have no incentive to relinquish their position of dominance (CASCIARO and 
PISKORSKI, 2005).  
 
The weak position of VFX firms is intensified by the increasing tendency for ‘runaway 
production’ activities to be used as a strategy for creating competition between regions 
which now utilize tax incentives and cost cutting as devices to attract offshore production 
(CHRISTOPHERSON and CLARKE, 2007b).  This results in a clear conflict between the 
strategy of TNCs and local SMEs (KRISTENSEN and ZEITLIN, 2005; RUTHERFORD 
and HOLMES, 2007).  The TNCs are interested in regional investment for cost-cutting 
purposes, which conflicts with the need of regional VFX firms to capture a greater share of 
revenue in a progressively more competitive industry with increasingly tight margins. Even 
further, the Hollywood majors now approach ‘runaway production’ as a mechanism for 
consolidating their power globally by ensuring that they are able to create and exploit cross-
regional competition and that they are not heavily dependent on any one VFX market. In 
this way, the Hollywood majors distribute VFX work globally, not simply as a strategy for 
                                                                                                                                           32 
 
 
value creation but as a mechanism for managing power relations across geographically 
dispersed regions (LEVY, 2008).  
 
This analysis has implications for understandings of the role that TNCs play in upgrading 
regional economies as depicted in the regional development literature (ASHEIM and 
ISAKSEN, 2006; ERNST and KIM, 2002; HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ, 2002). Existing 
research needs to be further supplemented with an analysis of the constraining effects of 
power relations in global production networks on the opportunities for local SMEs to 
pursue various upgrading strategies.  While TNCs are thought to provide a buffering 
against the volatility of regional markets in which SMEs are typically located (SABEL, 
2002), the Hollywood film production network is just as volatile as the domestic film, TV 
and TVC markets. This is because runaway production is heavily driven by cost 
considerations (including exchange rates) and inter-regional competition relating to tax 
incentives. In addition diversification across these markets does not necessarily offer an 
opportunity for liberation from the constraints of any one market. The media conglomerates 
of which Hollywood is a part own an increasing share of a variety of media and there is a 
tendency for VFX firms to specialize in particular market segments because of reputational 
effects. Further, while TNC are thought to drive upgrading in regional SMEs by forcing the 
latter to adapt superior technical standards (ERNST and KIM, 2002), in the VFX sector that 
does not translate into an ability to capture higher value. However, films financed and 
distributed by Hollywood certainly do typically provide a broader range of creative 
opportunities for regional SMEs.  
 
The research reported in this paper therefore has important implications for regional 
upgrading strategies which involve attempts to attract and support flagship TNCs that are at 
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the centre of global production networks. Such policies need to acknowledge the power 
differentials in global markets and the potential for TNC lead firms to dominate regional 
economies and manipulate the political-economic environment to their advantage 
(BUCKLEY and GHAURI, 2004; CHRISTOPHERSON and CLARK, 2007b; MORGAN 
and QUACK, 2005; PITELIS, 2006). In addition, such policies need to provide support to 
regional SMEs, which acknowledges their peripheral position in global production 
networks and the implications that has for their power to negotiate to capture value in 
global markets.  This might include policies which place conditions on TNC access to 
regional incentives or which link such incentives with support for regional SMEs. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Asheim G. and Isaksen A. (2002) Regional Innovation Systems: The integration of local 
‘sticky’ and global ‘ubiquitous’ knowledge, Journal of Technology Transfer 31, 
163. 
Bacharach S. B. and Lawler E. J. (1981) Power and tactics in bargaining, Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 34, 219–233. 
Buckley P. J. and Ghauri P. N. (2004) Globalization, economic geography and the strategy 
of multinational enterprises, Journal of International Business Studies 35, 81–98. 
Burt R. S. (1980) Autonomy in social typology, American Journal of Sociology 85, 892–
925. 
Casciaro T. and Piskorski M. J. (2005) Power imbalance, mutual dependence and constraint 
absorption: A closer look at resource dependency theory, Administrative Science 
Quarterly  50, 167–199. 
                                                                                                                                           34 
 
 
Christopherson S. (2006) Behind the scenes: How transnational firms are constructing a 
new international division of labor in media work, Geoforum 37, 739–751. 
Christopherson S. and Clark J. (2007a) Power in firm networks: What it means for regional 
innovation systems,  Regional Studies 41(9), 1223–1236. 
Christopherson S. and Clark J. (2007b) Remaking Regional Economies: Power, Labor and 
Firm Strategies in the Knowledge Economy. Routledge, London.  
Coe N. and Johns J. (2004) Beyond productions clusters: Toward a critical political 
economy of networks in the film and television industries, in Power D.  and Scott A. 
(Eds)  Cultural Industries and the Production of Culture, pp. 188–203. Routledge,  
New York.  
Coe N., Dicken M. P. and Hess M. (2008) Global production networks: Realizing the 
potential, Journal of Economic Geography 8, 271–295. 
Cooke G. A. S. and Pandit N. R. (2005) Clustered high technology small firms and 
innovation networks: The case of post-production in London, in During W., Oakey 
R. P. and Kauser S. (Eds) New Technology-Based Firms in the New Millennium, pp. 
165–184. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam. 
Corbin J. and Strauss A. (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory 
Procedures and Techniques. Sage, London. 
Cucco M. (2009)  The promise is great: The blockbuster and the Hollywood economy, 
Media Culture Society 31, 215–230. 
Eisenhardt K. (1989) Building theories from case study research, Academy of Management 
Review 14, 532–550. 
Eisenhardt K. and Graebner M. (2007) Theory building from cases: Opportunities and 
challenges, Academy of Management Journal 50(1), 25–32. 
                                                                                                                                           35 
 
 
Epstein E. J. (2005) The Big Picture: The New Logic of Money and Power in Hollywood. 
Random House, New York. 
Ernst D. and Linsu K. (2002) Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local 
capability formation, Research Policy 31, 1417–1429. 
FCC (2007) 13th Annual Report. Washington, DC, USA. September 24 2009. Available at   
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-206A1.pdf. 
Fligstein N. (2001) The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-first 
Century Capitalist Societies. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Gereffi G. (1994) The organization of buyer-driven global commodity chains: How US 
retailers shape overseas production networks, in Gereffi G. and Korzeniewicz M.  
(Eds) Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, pp. 95–122. Praeger, Westport. 
Gereffi G. (1996) Global commodity chains: New forms of coordination and control among 
nations and firms in international industries, Competition and Change 1, 427–439. 
Gereffi G. (1999) International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity 
chain, Journal of International Economics 48, 427–439. 
Gereffi G. (2005) The global economy: Organization, governance, and development, in 
Smelser N. and Swedberg R. (Eds) Handbook of Economic Sociology, pp. 160–182. 
Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, Princeton NJ. 
Gereffi G., Humphrey J. and Sturgeon T. (2005) The governance of global value chains, 
Review of International Political Economy 12(1), 78–104. 
Gibson C. and Kong L. (2005) Cultural economy: A critical review, Progress in Human 
Geography 29(5), 541–561. 
Grabher G. (2002) The project ecology of advertising: Tasks, talents and teams, Regional 
Studies 36(3), 245–262. 
                                                                                                                                           36 
 
 
Henderson J., Dicken P., Hess M., Coe N. and Yeung, H. (2002) Global production 
networks and the analysis of economic development, Review of International Political 
Economy 9, 436–464. 
 
Humphrey J. and Schmitz H. (2002) How does insertion in global value chains affect 
upgrading in industrial clusters? Regional Studies 36(9), 1017–1028. 
Johns J. (2006) Video games production networks: Value capture, power relations and 
embeddedness, Journal of Economic Geography 6, 151–180. 
Kaplinsky R. (2000) Globalization and unequalization: What can be learned from value 
chain analysis? Journal of Development Studies 37(2), 117–146.  
Kalantaridis C., Vassilev I. and Fallon G. (2010) Enterprise strategies, governance structure 
and performance: A comparative study of global integration, Regional Studies. First 
published on 18 February 2010 (iFirst). 
Katila R., Rosenberger J. and Eisenhardt K. (2008) Swimming with sharks: Technology 
ventures, defense mechanisms and corporate relationships, Administrative Science 
Quarterly 53, 295–332. 
Kristensen P-H. and Zeitlin J. (2005) Local Players in Global Games: The Strategic 
Constitution of a Multi-national Corporation. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Levy D. L. (2008) Political contestation in global production networks, Academy of 
Management Review 33(4), 943–963. 
Morgan C. (2008) The Age, April 17. 
Morgan G. and Quack S. (2005) Institutional legacies and firm dynamics: The growth and 
internationalization strategies of British and German law firms, Organization 
Studies 26(12), 1765–1785. 
                                                                                                                                           37 
 
 
Morse J. M. (1995) The significance of saturation, Qualitative Health Research 5(2), 147–
149. 
Noam E. (2009) Media Ownership and Concentration in America. Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
Oliver C. (1991) Strategic responses to institutional processes, Academy of Management 
Review 16, 145–179. 
Pfeffer J. and Leong A. (1977) Resource allocation in United Funds: Examination of power 
and dependency, Social Forces 55, 775–790. 
Pfeffer J. and Novak P. (1976) Joint ventures and interorganizational interdependence, 
Administrative Science Quarterly 21, 398–18. 
Pfeffer G. and Salancik G. R. (1978) The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. Harper & Row, New York. 
Pitelis C. (2006) Stephen Herbert Hymer and/on the (theory of the) MNE and international 
business, International Business Review 15, 103–110. 
Porter M. E. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations. Macmillan, London. 
Provan K. G., Beyer J. M. and Kruytbosch C. (1980) Environmental linkages and power in 
resource-dependence relations between organizations, Administrative Science 
Quarterly 25, 200–225.  
Rickitt R. (2006) Special Effects: The History and Technique. Aurum Press, London. 
Rosmarin R. (2007) Digital media: Hollywood goes high-tech. Forbes.com, 06/07/07, 
Available at http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/07/shrek-pirates-effects-tech-
cx_rr_0606movietech.htm (accessed on 7 January 2009). 
Rutherford T. D. and Holmes J. (2007) Entrepreneurship, knowledge and learning in cluster 
formation and evolution: The Windsor Ontario tool, die and mould cluster, 
                                                                                                                                           38 
 
 
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 7(2/3/4/5), 
320–344. 
Sabel P. (2002) Diversity, not specialization: The ties that bind the (new) industrial district, 
in Quadro A. C.  and Fortis M.  (Eds) Complexity and Industrial Clusters: 
Dynamics and Models in Theory and Practice, pp.107–122. Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin. 
Scott A. (2002) A new map of Hollywood: The production and distribution of American 
motion pictures, Regional Studies 36(9), 957–975. 
Scott A. (2004a). Hollywood and the world: The geography of motion-picture distribution 
and marketing, Review of International Political Economy 11(1), 33–61. 
Scott A. (2004b) The other Hollywood: The organizational and geographic bases of 
television-program production, Media, Culture and Society 26, 183–205. 
Turnock J. (2009) Before Industrial Light and Magic: The independent Hollywood special 
effects business, 1968 – 1975, New Review of Film and Television Studies 7(2), 
133–156. 
Wasko J. (2003) How Hollywood Works. Sage, London. 
Whitley R. (1996) Business systems and global commodity chains: Competing or 
complementary forms of economic organization, Competition and Change 1, 411–
425.  
Whitley R. (2005) Project-based firms: New organizational form or variations on a theme. 
Industrial and Corporate Change 15(1), 77–99.
                                                                                                                                           39 
 
 
 
Table 1: Interviewees 
 
Type Of 
Organization 
No of interviews with 
that type of 
organization 
Date of Interview Location of 
Interview 
Training institutes 3 August-December 
2007 
Brisbane, 
Melbourne, Sydney 
Industry 
Association 
6 August-December 
2007 
Brisbane, 
Melbourne, Sydney 
PDV Firm 3 August-December 
2007 
Brisbane, 
Melbourne, Sydney 
VFX Firm 7 August –December 
2007 
Melbourne, Sydney 
PDV Firm 2 July 2008 Sydney 
VFX Firm 3 July 2008 Sydney 
VFX Firm 7 April 2009 London 
VFX Firm 5 April 2009 Toronto, 
Vancouver, 
Montreal 
Total interviews 36   
Total VFX Firms 22   
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Table 2: Regional analysis of VFX Firms Credits 
 
Country  Mean 
number 
of 
credits 
Number 
of firms 
Region
al 
distribu
tion of 
firms 
(%) 
Mean % of 
each firms’ 
total 
credits 
related to 
Hollywood 
Mean % of 
each firms’ 
film credits 
related to 
Hollywood 
Mean % of 
each firms’ 
tv credits 
related to 
Hollywood  
Mean % of 
each firms’ 
other 
credits 
related to 
Hollywood 
Australia 21.25 28 4.4 46.1 61.2 24 14.8 
Canada 16.1 80 12.5 61.8 72.9 22.9 4.2 
UK 22.4 83 13 63 80.1 13.9 6.0 
USA 10.9 354 55.3 85.4 90.4 7.1 2.5 
Other  2.7 95 14.8 61.3 89.6 5.7 4.8 
Total 12.3 640 100 74.3 85.5 10 4.0 
 
Source: Author’s VFX credit database 
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Table 3: The response of VFX firms to global pressures 
 
 
ID Country 
First 
Credit 
Date 
Av Film 
Budget 
Av TV 
Budget 
Av Other 
Budget 
Does 
production? 
No of 
credits % film % tv % other 
A1 Aust 2006 . . . Y 4 25.0 75.0 0.0 
A2 Aust 1987 43.4 . . N 40 55.0 40.0 5.0 
A3 Aust 1990 28.5 . . N 40 40.0 35.0 25.0 
A4 Aust 1994 54.8 8.5 . Y 63 84.1 11.1 4.8 
A5 Aust 1994 34.1 5.0 13.0 N 35 60.0 17.1 22.9 
A6 Aust 1996 47.1 . . N 31 58.1 32.3 9.7 
A7 Aust 2001 33.2 . . N 22 86.4 13.6 0.0 
A8 Aust 2001 130.0 . . N -a 5.0b 5.0 b 90.0 b 
A9 Aust 1995 89.0 . . N 62 95.2 3.2 1.6 
A10 Aust 1990 36.6 . . N 120 45.0 46.7 8.3 
C1 Can 1997 46.1 37.5 . N 36 75.0 25.0 0.0 
C2 Can 2005 78.6 . . N 7 100.0 0.0 0.0 
C3 Can 2008 33.5 . . N 3 100.0 0.0 0.0 
C4 Can 2008 . . . N 7 42.9 57.1 0.0 
C5 Can 2004 10.3 6.0 . N 38 42.1 50.0 7.9 
L1 UK 2006 146.0 . . N 11 100.0 0.0 0.0 
L2 UK 2001 . . . N 21 9.5 81.0 9.5 
L3 UK 2001 88.7 . . N 24 16.7 79.2 4.2 
L4 UK 2001 12.8 . . N 40 75.0 22.5 2.5 
L5 UK 2005 13.0 . . N 14 57.1 28.6 14.3 
L6 UK 1994 61.8 100.0 . N 50 48.0 26.0 26.0 
L7 UK 1995     -a 0.0 30.0 b 70.0 b 
Average   54.9    33.4 55.5 30.8 13.7 
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Table 3 continued: The response of VFX firms to global pressures 
 
ID % Hollywood % USA % UK % Canada % Oz % Other country 
A1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
A2 35.0 27.5 5.0 0.0 65.0 25.0 
A3 17.5 12.5 7.5 0.0 90.0 17.5 
A4 65.1 57.1 6.3 1.6 66.7 17.5 
A5 40.0 40.0 5.7 0.0 68.6 17 
A6 32.3 25.8 6.5 0.0 87.1 19.4 
A7 40.9 45.5 9.1 9.1 63.6 9.1 
A8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.0 b 65.0 b 
A9 61.3 61.3 16.1 3.2 58.1 24.2 
A10 14.2 16.7 5.8 0.8 85.8 6.7 
C1 75.0 83.3 13.9 44.4 2.8 13.9 
C2 85.7 100.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 14.3 
C3 66.7 66.7 0.0 66.7 0.0 33.3 
C4 28.6 28.6 0.0 100.0 0.0 28.6 
C5 26.3 63.2 13.2 68.4 2.6 13.2 
L1 100.0 100.0 54.5 9.1 0.0 9.1 
L2 4.8 19.0 85.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
L3 25.0 25.0 77.3 4.5 0.0 16.7 
L4 35.0 37.5 90.0 2.5 0.0 35.0 
L5 50.0 50.0 78.6 0.0 7.1 28.6 
L6 30.0 34.0 80.0 2.0 0.0 18.0 
L7 0.0  > 90.0 b    
Average 37.9 42.6 30.0 14.9 34.9 19.6 
Source: Authors’ VFX credit database 
aUnknown 
bEstimate. See data base description 
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Figure 1: VFX firms over time and per region 
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NOTES 
                                                 
i From the 1990s, various terms have been used to refer to the networks of production that 
comprise global markets including value chains (PORTER, 1990), global commodity 
chains (GEREFFI, 1994, 1996; WHITLEY, 1996), global value chains (GEREFFI et al., 
2005) and global production networks (COE et al., 2008; LEVY, 2008). They share in 
common a concern with value capture, power and territorial embeddedness (JOHNS, 
2006). 
 
ii PDV refers to post, digital and visual effects and is used by the sector to capture the 
increasing tendency for work which was once part of post-production to be undertaken 
before or during production. According to Screen Australia, the industry ‘incorporates 
sound and visual editing, digital effects, creation of computer-generated images (CGI), 
film laboratory work and duplication services’. Our analysis is focused on the segment of 
digital effects and CGI. 
 
iii A film production was coded as Hollywood-related if it was produced or distributed by 
a major Hollywood studio or one of its subsidiaries (SCOTT, 2004a). For the television 
sector, the broadcast and cable channels owned by the Hollywood majors or their 
subsidiaries were also coded as Hollywood-related (FCC, 2007). As SCOTT (2004a) 
shows, the majors and their subsidiaries captured approximately 90% of the motion 
picture box office in the USA in 2000, despite releasing only 46% of the motion pictures 
in 2000. It is these larger films that contain most of the VFX work; independently 
released films generally have smaller budgets as well as smaller box office, and have 
fewer  
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